Egypt: Legal Commentary on the Listing of Entities and Individuals in Europe on Terrorism Lists

Purpose and Scope of the Commentary

This legal commentary aims to shed light on the decision issued by the Second Circuit of the Cairo Criminal Court, sitting in chambers at the Badr appeals division, listing 35 entities operating abroad and 36 individuals, in Listing Request No. 1 of 2026 (terrorist entities listing decisions) and Decision No. 1 of 2026 (terrorists listing decisions), in Case No. 11108 of 2026, Supreme State Security.

In this commentary, the Foundation seeks only to address the procedural and legal aspects of the listing. It does not adopt a position on the listed entities and individuals, nor on the truth of what has been attributed to them.

The decision sets a precedent in its breadth. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the Egyptian authorities have used the Terrorist Entities Law No. 8 of 2015 against associations registered in European states and operating under their laws. The decision thereby exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction without clarifying the link or the acts that would justify it, and without complying with legal and constitutional guarantees or with Egypt’s international obligations.

Law and Democracy Support Foundation (LDSF) had previously issued a position paper addressing how the Egyptian authorities use counter-terrorism laws and policies as tools of transnational repression. The paper identified listing on terrorism lists as one of the patterns of violations that have expanded in recent years.

The commentary is based on the text of the decision as published in Al-Waqa’i’ Al-Misriyya (the Egyptian Gazette), Issue No. 250 (Supplement), dated 10 November 2026, a copy of which the Foundation has reviewed. The published text was limited to the operative part and the two lists of those listed, and contained no reasons.

I. Overview of the Decision

The Cairo Criminal Court issued its decision at a session held in chambers on 10 November 2026, in the presence of a representative of the Public Prosecution and in the absence of those against whom the decision was issued. Under the decision, thirty-five entities and thirty-six individuals were placed on the lists of terrorist entities and terrorists for a period of five years. The decision was published in Al-Waqa’i’ Al-Misriyya on the same date. Having reviewed it, the Foundation noted that it omits any statement of the reasons for the listing, in violation of the text of the Terrorist Entities Law itself.

The following table sets out the names of the entities and individuals placed on the lists of terrorist entities and terrorists under this decision:

LDSF notes that the decision covered two separate lists without stating any link between the entities and the individuals.

Translation note: the decision gives all names in Arabic only. The names of entities above are translated, and the names of individuals transliterated, from the Arabic text; they may differ from the official names and spellings used by those concerned.

As the list above shows, all the listed entities are institutions registered and operating outside Egypt, in the states of the European Union, Britain, Switzerland, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and the Balkan states.

They include bodies concerned with fatwa, imams, religious education, family affairs and students. It is also likely that all the listed individuals reside abroad; some hold foreign nationalities, and some do not hold Egyptian nationality.

The decision does not make clear what activities or acts the entities or individuals carried out that led the Prosecution to request their listing on the terrorism lists, a request which the Criminal Court then granted.

II. Legal Framework of the Decision

The decision was based on Law No. 8 of 2015 on the Regulation of Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists, as amended. It should be noted that listing under this law does not constitute a conviction, nor does the law require that there be a conviction against those listed. Nevertheless, listing produces effects that are comparable in gravity to a penalty.

The path laid down by the law for listing and appeal:

• Request: The first step. It is submitted by the Public Prosecutor to a competent criminal circuit, accompanied by the investigations and documents supporting it, according to the Public Prosecution.
• Decision: The second step. The competent criminal circuit decides on the request by a reasoned decision within seven days of its submission in complete form, in chambers and without notifying those whose listing is requested.
• Duration: The listing decision is valid for a period not exceeding five years, renewable.
• Entry into force: The effects of listing apply from the date of publication in Al-Waqa’i’ Al-Misriyya.
• Appeal: The law allows those concerned to appeal before the competent criminal circuit of the Court of Cassation within sixty days of the date of publication. It also allows them to request that sums be exempted from the frozen funds and assets to cover basic expenses such as food, housing, medicines and medical treatment.

For entities, the effects include a ban on activity, closure of premises, freezing of funds, and a prohibition on financing, joining and promoting the entity. For individuals, they include a travel ban and placement on arrival watch lists, or a ban on entry into the country for foreigners; withdrawal of the passport or refusal to renew it; freezing of funds; and loss of the good-reputation requirement needed to hold public office. These are grave effects which, although they do not require a conviction, can constitute a penalty in themselves.

In its paper entitled “Beyond Counter-Terrorism”, the Law and Democracy Support Foundation criticised the fact that the definition of a “terrorist entity” in Article 1 of the law is broad enough to include vague expressions such as disturbing public order and harming national unity, which allows it to be applied expansively and used against opponents and those expressing their opinions.

III. Legal Observations on the Decision

The Law and Democracy Support Foundation sets out below, in brief, its legal observations on the decision. Taken together, these observations raise serious concerns about the ease with which listing on terrorism lists can take place under flawed procedures that guarantee neither the right of defence nor the minimum guarantees of a fair trial for the person whose listing is requested.

These concerns are heightened by the room those procedures give the authorities to expand the listing of individuals and entities, without evidence being presented to those listed and subjected to adversarial challenge, and without stated reasons. The danger is compounded by the fact that listing, as explained above, produces grave effects that make it, in reality, a penalty imposed without conviction.

1. Listing without an adversarial hearing, a defence or stated reasons

The decision was issued without notifying those listed or hearing their defence. This is a defect in the structure of the law itself, which neither provides for nor requires that the entities or individuals whose listing is requested be able to attend the session at which the request is considered and defend themselves. The matter is all the more serious when those listed reside outside the country and learn of the measure only from the media.

This cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider context in Egypt, with its closing of the public sphere and restrictions on the right of defence, on human rights organisations and on lawyers. In addition to the absence of any defence at the session considering the request itself, the availability of an appeal in the legal text does not mean it is available in practice.

The Foundation sought the views of a number of lawyers, who asked not to be named. They stated that they would be very hesitant to accept instructions from listed entities or individuals residing abroad, even if this were legally open to them, because of the grave risks that representing them would entail for the lawyer personally.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Foundation has the following observations on the mechanism by which the decision was taken and may be appealed:

Absence of an adversarial hearing: The decision expressly states that it was issued in chambers, and only a representative of the Public Prosecution attended the session. The person whose listing is requested has no means of examining the inquiries, evidence and investigations submitted, or of responding to them, before the decision is issued.

Absence of reasons: Although Article 3 of the Terrorist Entities Law expressly provides that “…the competent circuit shall decide on the listing request by a reasoned decision within seven days of the date the request is submitted to it complete with the required documents”, the decision that is the subject of this commentary, as published in Al-Waqa’i’ Al-Misriyya, was limited to two lists of names. It states neither the reasons, nor the facts attributed to any entity or individual, nor any account of the evidence.

Insufficient time to review the listing request: The seven-day period stipulated by law to rule on the request is far too brief to allow the court to seriously examine a case file comprising 71 entities and individuals located across approximately thirty countries, or to scrutinize the investigations, inquiries, and evidence presented against them. Given the gravity of the repercussions, it is imperative that each request be studied individually and seriously, as is the case before judicial convictions are handed down—something that is difficult to achieve within such a short timeframe.

Difficulty of appeal: Although the law allows the decision to be appealed within sixty days of the date of publication, in practice this is clearly difficult, especially for those residing abroad. Apart from the restrictions on the public sphere mentioned above and the difficulty of instructing a lawyer, Egyptian consulates abroad, according to testimonies documented by the Law and Democracy Support Foundation, use the denial of consular services as a means of punishing opponents and those expressing their opinions who reside abroad. In addition, a number of citizens fear dealing with Egyptian consulates abroad in the first place.

All of this plainly affects a number of established guarantees and rights, most notably the presumption of innocence and the right of defence provided for in Articles 96 and 98 of the Constitution, as well as the right to a fair trial provided for in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Moreover, the effects of listing permit the withdrawal of passports or the refusal to issue them. They therefore directly affect the rights of citizenship, as well as freedom of movement as provided for in Article 62 of the Egyptian Constitution and Article 12 of the Covenant.

The claim that listing is a precautionary measure and not a penalty is not a sufficient answer to these observations. What matters is the gravity of the effects the decision produces, not its description or label. Furthermore, the long listing period, which extends to five years and is renewable, requires guarantees commensurate with it.

2. Jurisdiction extended to entities abroad

This decision sets a precedent in its breadth, as it reaches, in a single stroke, dozens of legal persons established under the laws of other states, and individuals who do not hold Egyptian nationality.

It therefore raises questions about the limits of the Egyptian state’s jurisdiction. We do not dispute that states have the right to criminalise acts that occur abroad and affect their security; this is the practice in Egyptian legislation and in the legislation of some other states.

This does not, however, remove the need to clarify the nature of the criminalised acts the state is confronting, the nature of the risks and their connection to the institutions and individuals being pursued, and the procedures taken to establish this, so that this principle does not become a pretext used by states to justify practices of transnational repression without transparency and clarity.

The listing decision, in its present form, does not rule on specific facts and is not enforceable outside Egypt. Yet it has labelled institutions lawfully existing in other states as terrorist without any clear guarantees. And although its practical effect does not come from direct enforcement inside Europe, it produces indirect harms such as the following:

• The social stigma attached to those listed and its effect on their opportunities for work, housing and livelihood, and also on their personal lives.
• The possibility of relying on this decision in extradition requests and security notices, particularly through third states that have security cooperation agreements with Egypt. In its paper “Beyond Counter-Terrorism”, the Foundation documented the misuse of Interpol and of security cooperation channels, and their use in practices of transnational repression.
• The use of the decision as a basis for diplomatic steps, such as calling on European governments to take similar measures.
• The possible inclusion of the names in the commercial compliance databases on which banks rely when assessing their customers, without the need for any request from the Egyptian authorities. A press investigation has previously linked the closure by a British bank in 2014 of the accounts of an institution and of individuals, including one of those listed in the present decision, to their appearance in one such database on the basis of a terrorism list issued by another state.

It should be noted that some of the entities named in the decision are themselves the subject of debate within Europe. A non-binding resolution of the European Parliament adopted on 8 October 2026 called for tighter scrutiny of the Council of European Muslims and the entities linked to it. To date, however, no European state has, to the best of our knowledge, taken any measures to designate those entities as terrorist. The debate is instead proceeding in accordance with each state’s procedures and judicial guarantees, which was not the case in the mechanisms by which the decision was issued in Egypt.

3. Impact on Egyptians in Europe

The harm resulting from the decision does not affect the listed entities alone. It extends to Egyptians residing in Europe who deal with these institutions and benefit from their services. The listed entities include bodies that run mosques, religious education centres and family services, which may be frequented by Egyptians with no connection to any political activity. This makes the shortcomings of the decision described above all the more significant: it was issued hastily and disclosed no clear reasons or evidence.

It should be noted that listing entails a prohibition on financing the entity, joining it and promoting it, acts which are punishable under the Egyptian Anti-Terrorism Law No. 94 of 2015.

This raises a number of questions, most notably:

• Do the authorities in Egypt consider a donation to a mosque affiliated with one of these entities, or the payment of tuition fees at a listed institute, to be financing of a terrorist entity?
• Could the authorities pursue Egyptians working in these institutions, whether as imams, teachers or administrators, using terrorism charges, which the authorities in Egypt have become known in recent years for using expansively against journalists, human rights defenders, political opponents and those expressing their opinions?
• And could they be held to account on their return to Egypt, or when requesting consular services?

The inability to answer these questions is enough to produce an effect that intimidates the beneficiaries and employees of those organisations and affects their way of life, their work and their livelihoods.

It is natural that some of those residing abroad will fear for their passports or for their families in Egypt, and that some will avoid these institutions as a precaution, even if they operate entirely lawfully in their country of residence.

As a result, the decision, despite the flaws in its procedures, the fact that it is not based on a judicial conviction and the speed with which it was issued, extends to and in practice affects the exercise of freedom of religion, assembly and association outside Egyptian territory. From this angle, it intersects with the patterns of transnational repression documented by our Foundation and by other organisations.

4. Lists without identifying data

Among the observations suggesting that the decision was issued collectively and in haste, and was not subjected to sufficient scrutiny, is that it does not identify those listed with sufficient precision to exclude uncertainty. This may extend its effect to individuals or entities it did not intend to cover.

The published text confines itself to names, without any other particulars distinguishing the intended person or entity from others.

As regards individuals: The names appear without any indication of nationality, date of birth, national identification number or passport number, or any other data that would identify the person intended unambiguously. Some names even consist of only two parts, such as “Mohamed Henni” and “Kamel Ben Amara”. This raises questions about the seriousness of the inquiries conducted in respect of those listed, and opens the door to confusion between similar names at border points, at consulates and in banking compliance systems.

Entities: These appear under names translated into Arabic, accompanied by the name of the state, without the official name in its original language or the registration number. Besides being evidence of weak inquiries, this could also affect institutions with similar names.

Branches: The Council of European Muslims and the European Institute of Human Sciences were listed “with all their branches”, without identifying those branches, their role or the acts they committed. It is not known which of their centres fall within the ban and which fall outside it. This confirms that the decision was issued collectively, without scrutiny commensurate with its gravity.

The uncertainty here is not a matter of form. The ban gives rise to criminal liability for anyone who finances or joins the listed entity, and criminalisation cannot stand unless those to whom it is addressed know with certainty what is prohibited to them. This compounds the effect described in the third observation.

IV. Recommendations

To the Egyptian authorities:

1. Publish the full reasons for the decision, and enable those listed and their representatives to examine the request file.
2. Identify those listed with sufficient identifying data, and specify exhaustively what is meant by the branches of the listed entities.
3. Guarantee an effective appeal for those residing abroad, including by facilitating the granting of powers of attorney without requiring attendance at consulates.
4. Issue an official clarification that dealings by Egyptians abroad with institutions lawfully existing in their countries of residence, within the limits of religious practice and services, do not give rise to criminal liability.
5. Review Law No. 8 of 2015 so as to ensure that the person whose listing is requested is notified and heard before the decision is taken, and narrow the definition of a terrorist entity.

To the European authorities and financial institutions:

1. Give no automatic effect to the decision, subject any measure against entities or individuals on their territory solely to their own laws and judicial guarantees, and protect those residing on their territory from the indirect effects of the decision.
2. Subject any extradition or mutual legal assistance request based on this decision to rigorous judicial scrutiny in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and the principle of non-refoulement.
3. Coordinate with the INTERPOL General Secretariat and European security bodies to prevent the circulation or activation of any red notices or security alerts based on listings that lack the guarantees of a fair trial, the right of defence and adversarial proceedings, including requests submitted through third states.
4. Raise the expansive use of counter-terrorism laws and its transnational impact in bilateral dialogue sessions between the European Union and Egypt, and make any security or judicial cooperation conditional on respect for fair trial guarantees.
5. Require banking institutions and providers of compliance databases not to list entities or individuals on the basis of lists issued by states whose procedures lack judicial guarantees, and establish swift and transparent mechanisms for challenging and correcting data where names are confused.